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Abstract. This article presents a new quantum-like model for cognition explicitly
based on knowledge. It is shown that this model, called QKT (quantum knowledge-
based theory), is able to coherently describe some experimental results that are
problematic for the prior quantum-like decision models. In particular, I consider the
experimental results relevant to the post-decision cognitive dissonance, the problems
relevant to the question order effect and response replicability, and those relevant to
the grand-reciprocity equations. A new set of postulates is proposed, which evidence
the different meaning given to the projectors and to the quantum states. In the final
part, I show that the use of quantum gates can help to better describe and understand
the evolution of quantum-like models.
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1. Introduction
Subjects’ behaviour is often claimed to be irrational [1]. Quantum cognition, a quite
recent research field making use of concepts and methods taken from the quantum theory
and quantum probability, seems to be a particularly useful and promising framework to
describe a variety of seemingly irrational judgment and decisionmaking findings, thus
providing a new perspective for cognitive science. The main hypothesis is that human
reasoning - in a wide range of situations relevant to bounded-rationality - obeys the laws
of quantum rather than classical probability. Quantum cognition allows taking into
account puzzling effects like conjunction fallacies [2], disjunction fallacies, averaging
effects, unpacking effects, and order effects [3], violations of sure-thing principle in
decision theory [4], violations of symmetry in similarity judgements [5] and producing
new predictions like the quantum question (QQ) equality [6].
Despite its successful applications, in last years some experimental data evidenced that
the theory needs a deeper understanding. In particular, the violation of the Grand-
reciprocity (GR) equations [7] and the problems relevant to question order effects
and response replicability [8]. An even deeper critique arrives from [9], where it is
noted that the same formalism has been used (for example in conjunction fallacy
experiments) to describe both judgements (subjective probabilities) and choice tasks
(objective probabilities). The authors thus argue that to suppose these two models are
of the same class seems to be an error.
In this article, I present a new quantum-like theory for cognition based on a new
set of postulates. Even if the mathematical framework is essentially the same of the
previous quantum-like model, such postulates allow for a more coherent description
of experimental data in terms of quantum states, preparations, test and information
architecture, thus overcoming the problems evidenced before. In particular, the new
model clearly distinguishes between subjective and objective probabilities, focusing on
the concept of subject’s knowledge. I also present other set of experimental results (the
post-decision cognitive dissonance case) that are in contradiction with previous quantum
decision theory, while correclty described with the new set of postulates.
Finally, I introduce in the model concepts and mathematical tools taken from
quantum computation to quickly operate with cognitive models based on quantum
composite systems. These tools suggest a procedural description of cognitive processes
in terms of gates and algorithms, and a cognitive interpretation of the quantum phase.
In summary, this articles evidences that the potentialities of quantum formalism in
cognitive science aren’t at the moment fully explored and used, and much work remains
to be done.
2. Starting from the basics
Quantum theoretical predictions rely on conceptual models which involve elusive
microscopic objects, such as electrons, photons, etc. The latter are usually considered
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as real things, but they occasionally display extraordinary nonlocal properties, quite
at variance with intuitive classical realism. However, the predictions of quantum
theory are relevant to the probability of occurrence of stochastic macroscopic events,
following specified preparation procedures, such as, for instance, the triggering of particle
detectors following the collision of a specified beam with a given target.
In a similar way, quantum cognition theory makes predictions relevant to subject’s
anwsers following specific preparation procedures consisting in input information. Such
predictions rely on another elusive object, the subject’s thougths. Nobody has never
seen really a thought or an electron.
The use in cognitive psychology of definitions taken from the quantum theory offers
the opportunity of getting precise concepts already built to describe situations with
uncertainty, measurements and interference. Following [10], we recall two important
definitions in the quantum theory, the preparation and the test. A preparation is
an experimental procedure that specifies the quantum state, like a recipe in a good
cookbook. In quantum physics, any experiment is always performed over a set of
identically prepared states. The test is the process leading to the experimental outcome.
In the first part, it is like a preparation, but it also includes a final step in which
information, previously unknown, is supplied to an observer. This is the new information
about the quantum state that the test allows one to obtain. Note that a preparation
usually involves tests, but they are followed by a selection of specific outcomes. For
example, a mass spectrometer can prepare a certain type of particle by measuring the
masses of various incoming particles and selecting those with the desired properties.
In cognitive psychology we can use preparation and test in a similar way. The
preparation represents the information given to subjects in the preliminar part of an
experiment. The test is the final part of the experiment, where subjects provide an
outcome. As a trivial example, let us suppose that in the preparation phase we say
there is a car, which can be blue or red. Thus we have defined the possible outcomes of
the test. The preparation can let subjects be completely uncertain about the car’s color
(blue or red, we don’t know), or it can add a selective information, like for example we
know that the car is red. In the test phase, we ask to the subjects the color of the car.
In the first case, they will answer one of the two colors with 50% of probability. In the
other case, they will all answer red. Even repeating the question, they will give the same
answer. But if we ask to subject another question like Is that car driven by a woman?,
the answer will be yes for some subjects and no for others.
In the quantum theory, test on a given quantum system is called maximal or
complete when the number of different outcomes N (let us suppose that N is finite)
is also the maximum number of different outcomes obtainable in a test of that system.
An incomplete test is one where some outcomes are lumped together, for example,
because the experimental equipment has insufficient resolution, leading to degenerate
outcomes. In the quantum cognition context, we can say to subjects that the car can
be red, blue or yellow, but in the test we only ask if the car is red or not red. It is
clear that in cognitive psychology the resolution of the test is an important problem
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and depends on many factors: the possible outcomes presented in the preparation, but
also the cognitive resources that subjects can use.
In physics, tests allow computing event probabilities. Of course, what we obtain is
the the measured relative frequency of an event, but if we repeat the same experiment
a large (but finite) number of times, we can expect a small difference between the
measured relative frequency and the true probability. For example, we can determine
the approximate probability distribution of a quantum particle P (x) by repeating a
position test on many identically prepared particles. More particles are involved, more
accurate will be the probability estimate. Each particle is detected with a random
position whose statistical distribution is given by P (x).
In cognitive psychology, it is necessary to carefully define the concept of test. Given
a preparation with an incomplete information, the subjects’ answers in a cognitive
experiment are clearly stochastic. But this does not mean that subjects give a random
answer just like quantum particles. Usually, cognitive tests ask subjects to give the
answer they think is correct, not to give the first answer that comes into mind. Moreover,
in other experiments subjects are asked to judge the probability of an unknown event.
This means that cognitive tests are less direct than tests in quantum physics, and they
are usually designed to exctract more information from subjects, even if it is the result
of a cognitive elaboration.
A second important differece is that in cognitive experiments the subject’s answer
can be considered not only as an information about the cognitive state before the test,
but also a new information. In fact, the answer itself is an event, and the subjects, when
they have enough cognitive resources, are aware of their answer and they consider it in
successive judgements and decisions. This is different from tests in quantum phsyics,
where the system dimension does not change after the experiment.
3. Quantum knowledge postulates for cognition
I present here a new set of postulates for the new quantum cognition model. They differ
from those defined in [3] in many points, even if the mathemathics is the same. This
new model will be named quantum knowledge model of cognition(QKT), while the other
quantum decision model , underlining the fact that the two models give predictions
about different things: the former about the knowledge of uncertain events (mainly
judgements and indirectly choices) while the latter only about decisions.
Postulate 1: subjects’ cognitive representation is given by a state vector in a multi-
dimensional space (technically, an N-dimensional Hilbert space). The architecture of
the managed information determines the type of representation, using the minimum of
cognitive resources.
The first postulate introduces the concept of cognitive representation involved in a
cognitive task. When asked to perform a task, subjects use a cognitive representation
which allows to consider and elaborate the known information. The postulate introduces
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two important new concepts, the information architecture (or structure) and the
cognitive resourses.
Let us first consider the information architecture. In the quantum formalism, a
composite system is given by the tensor product of the Hilbert spaces of the subsystems
H1⊗H2⊗.... Each Hilbert space is used for representing a particular type of information.
The information structure that subjects have to manage strongly determines the
structure of the Hilbert space involved in the cognitive representation. However, in
general, subjects can interpret their representations in different ways, leading to simpler
or richer structures. Let us consider some examples, starting with the basic configuration
of two dichotomic events A and B. For instance, A Linda is feminist and B Linda is
bankteller, like in the classic conjunction fallacy experiments. The actual quantum-like
models allow building two different configurations. The simplest is a bi-dimensional
space H (non-degenerate model) [2], where the two dimensions correspond to the event
Linda is feminist and to its negation. This model is based on a single qubit. On the
contrary, subjects could consider the description of Linda and build a more detailed
representation in the working memory. In this case, the dimensionality of the Hilbert
space is higher than 2 and the model is degenerate [3]. This second model is supposed
to be used whenever subjects have more time to think. In general, however, nothing
prevents subjects from using two different Hilbert spaces for such events (two qubits or
two different registers relevant for example to Linda’s interests and jobs respectively),
leading to a composite representation.
What determines the subjects’ strategy? Of course the time to answer, but also
the information architecture. In the Linda experiment, the two events are relevant to
the same person and they are somehow correlated. In other cases, instead, it is more
natural to represent the two events in different spaces. For example, unrelated events
(like balls drawn from two different urns in [11]) could be better represented with two
different Hilbert spaces. In fact, an event relevant to the first urn has no correlation
with an event relevant to the second urn. Composite representations could be necessary
also when the information is structurally different and can be enriched in time. For
example subjects could have to manage decisions and judgements about an uncertain
event, like in post-decisional dissonance experiments [12], where bettors are asked to
decide which horse will win and after to judge the probability that such horse will win.
In this case, the basic representation (the horse wins or looses) is enriched with the
decision representation (the previous bet on the horse). The introduction of additional
quantum registers - a quite standard strategy in quantum computation - thus becomes
important also in the context of quantum cognition. In [13] we can find an example of
a composite system to manage two different kinds of choices, but this is in the context
of quantum decision theory and it doesn’t seem part of a general strategy.
The second point, introduced by postulate 1, states that subjects tend to use
the minimum of cognitive resources in order to define their representations. This is
consistent with the studies integrating psychology and formal information theory in
terms of storage capacity. Supposing that one bit of information discriminates between
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two alternatives, experimental results support the ”7 ± 2 bits” theory of storage [14].
In other words, subjects have to face with a limited storage capacity for their working
memory, unless considering chuncking strategies (which will be treated in a separate
paper). It is clear however, that if subjects have to produce judgements in very short
time, the avaliable storage capacity will be very low. On the contrary, more time to
think will lead to the availability of more resources and thus more complex information
structure.
We can now recall the concept of pure state. If a quantum system is prepared
in such a way that it certainly yields a predictable outcome in a specified maximal
test, the various outcomes of any other test have definite probabilities. In particular,
these probabilities do not depend on the details of the procedure used for preparing
the quantum system, so that it yields a specific outcome in the given maximal test. A
system prepared in such a way is said to be in a pure state.
The simplest method for producing quantum systems in a given pure state is to
subject them to a complete test, and to discard all the systems that did not yield the
desired outcome. For example, perfect absorbers may be inserted in the path of the
outgoing beams that we do not want. When this has been done, all the past history
of the selected quantum systems becomes irrelevant. The fact that a quantum system
produces a definite outcome, if subjected to a specific maximal test, completely identifies
the state of that system, and this is the most complete description that can be given of
it.
Identical preparations for different subjects allow using the same vector state |ψ〉
as described by the first postulate. Such state is also called pure state. Different
preparations require to use mixed states, which are statistical mixtures of pure states
with weights represented by probabilities relevant to the preparations themselves. They
are described mathematically by the density matrix ρ.
It is important to stress that receiving the same information does not entail the
same cognitive representation for different subjects. In fact, they could have different
mental models, enabling different ways to elaborate and encode such information.
Postulate 2. The certain knowledge about a verifiable event is represented by a
subspace of the vector space and thus by a projector.
The formulation of the second postulate is different from that defined in [3] because
it underlines that the subspace is not made in correspondence with an event, but with
the certain knowledge of an event. The actual quantum decision model contains an
ambiguity about the concept of event that leads to some problems. Let us analyze this
ambiguity in detail. Given a question like Is Linda feminist?, we have to define two
distinct events: Linda is feminist and The subject says that Linda is feminist. In other
words, subject’s answer ”yes” to a question represents another event which is distinct
from the original event described in the question. In the original postulate, there isn’t
such distinction and the simple act of answering to a question alters the original state.
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This ambiguity is made explicity in the post-decisional cognitive dissonance
experiments, where the decision about an event has to be considered as another distinct
event, which in a second time may alter the judgements about the original event.
I conclude the analysis of the second postulate by noting that the use of projectors,
even in a degenerate model, could be generalized in order to produce a more realistic
description of reality. In most cases an event cannot be defined in terms of mutually
exclusive features, which are required by the actual model. As shown in information
architecture, exact organization schemas are less used in real life. Most of organization
schemas, for example in the world wide web context, are ambiguous [15]. For example,
looking for a book may require searching by author or title, but if we dont know them
we need to search by topic, and topics represent an ambiguous organization. Thus it
could be necessary to generalize the concept of projectors and use POVM (positive op-
eratov value measurement) operators, as attempted in preliminary articles [16, 17, 18],
in order to take into account experimental situations where questions are onn mutually
exclusive. A new article about this topic will be submitted [19].
Postulate 3: the judged probability that an event is true equals the squared length of
the projection of the state vector onto the subspace representing the certain knowledge
of the event.
Again, the postulate removes the concept of anwser to a question, working only
with the knowledge of the event and its degree of knowledge. It is important to under-
line two important points. The new model is not able to make predictions about the
probability that subjects give a particular answer. It works mainly with judged prob-
abilities. Decision probabilities in this model are secondary objects, deriving from the
knowledge of uncertain facts. The second consideration is that extracting the judged
probability can be considered at a first stage a read-only operation over the cognitive
state. However, also the produced judgement becomes part of the cognitive system,
because it corresponds to the event the subject says thay the probability relevant to the
event is X.
Postulate 4: the updated cognitive state after a subject knows with certainty that an
event is true equals the normalized projection on the subspace representing that event.
From a formal point of view, the updated state is defined according to the Lu¨der’s
rule, like presented in [3]. Thus the consitional state |ψA〉 under the action of projector
PA on |ψ〉 is PA|ψ〉/||PA|ψ〉||. It is important to distinguish between the knowledge of
a fact and expressing a personal opinion. The new postulate introduces a different way
to consider measurement. While in fact a physical system can be measured in order
to obtain a value of a physical quantity, a direct measurement of a cognitive system is
more difficult. The cognitive state relevant to the description of a possible event changes
directly only when new information is provided to increase certainty. Such information
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can arrive from outside (for example, someone tells us that event is true, or we see
directly the event) or from inside (for example, if I make a choice, in the mental space
of my choices there is a certain fact).
As we will see later in this article, the post-decision cognitive dissonance experi-
ments can be correctly interpreted with the modified postulate 4 by considering that
the choice to bet on an horse does not produce a projection over the initial cognitive
state relevant to the event the horse will win the race. This projection will happen only
when the horse really wins.
Postulate 5: if no new information is provided, the subject’s cognitive state evolves
in time through the application of a unitary operation.
Thus the free evolution of cognitive states (that is the evolution without answers,
judgements, new information) is provided by unitary operators. These are reversible,
differently from the addition of new information. The form of the unitary operator may
depend on many factors: in section 8 such evolution is studied in terms of quantum
gates.
4. The opinion poll problem
I now show that the new model is able to take into account puzzling problems arising
from the previous quantum-like model. In this section I consider the opinion poll
problem [8], where two important properties (the response replicability and the order
effect) are shown to be incompatible.
The response replicability property states that, for a large class of questions, a
response to a given question is expected to be repeated if the question is posed again
irrespective of whether another question is asked and answered in between. The order
effect reveals that the probabilities relevant to subjects’s consecutive answers to two
different questions change depending on the order of the questions. The main problem
in the previous quantum-like model is that each answer produces a collapse on the
original cognitive state, which is defined on a unique Hilbert space. Thus the second
answers completly removes the information relevant to the first one. The only way to
obtain response replicability is to use commuting operators relevant to the two questions,
which in turn removes the order effect.
On the contrary, in the quantum knowledge model the decision can produce only
indirect effects on the original cognitive state. Each answer leads to the addition of a new
Hilbert space describing this new inofrmation. Let us consider the example of the cited
article, where the question A is Is Bill Clinton honest and trustworthy? and B Is Al
Gore honest and trustworthy?. Such questions are defined as non-commuting projectors
acting on the same Hilbert space. On the contrary, in the quantum-knowledge model
these operators are relevant to the concrete knowledge that Clinton/Al Gore is honest
and trustworthy and they act on different Hilbert spaces. Thus the initial cognitive state
is, in the simplest case, a pure state given by the tensor product of the states relevant
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to the uncertain knowledge about Clinton and Al Gore respectively:
|ψ〉 = |ψClinton〉|ψAlGore〉 (1)
After the answer to Clinton’s question, there isn’t new knowledge about Clinton. Only
a new information is added (the subject’s anwser), thus leading to a new Hilbert
space. Moreover, a unitary operator is applied which acts on |ψ〉 in a conditional way
(depending on the anwser about Clinton). This unitary operation is the expression of a
cognitive-dissonance reducing strategy, and it consists in a rotation of the original belief
state towards the new state.
|ψ′〉 = |a(i)Clinton〉Ui|ψClinton〉|ψAlGore〉 (2)
where a(i)Clinton is the answer to Clinton’s question, and i = 0, 1 (false/true). If the
first question would be the one relevant to Al Gore, we should have
|ψ′′〉 = |b(j)AlGore〉U ′j |ψClinton〉|ψAlGore〉 (3)
It is clear from this formalism that the two unitary evolutions U and U ′ could be different
and thus lead to the question order effect. Cognitive dissonance experiments suggest
that such evolutions will confirm the judgements relevant the first answer and adapt
the uncertainty relevant to the second question accordingly. However, the replicability
property is preserved, because the information relevant to the first anwser is encoded
into a different quantum register (relevant to the first Hilbert space).
5. Postdecision cognitive dissonance
In this section, I present another new case where the previous quantum-like model
evidences some issues, the postdecision cognitive dissonance experiments.
Cognitive dissonance theory, first developed by Leon Festigner [20], dominated
social psychology research form the 1950s until the 1970s. The theory revoluzioned
thinking about psychological prcesses, particularly regarding how rewards influence and
attitude behavior, and how behavior and motivation influence perception and cognition.
According to the theory, when an individual holds two or more elements of knowledge
that are relevant to each other but inconsistent with one another, a state of discomfort
is created, called dissonance. Persons are motivated by such state and they may engage
in psychological work to reduce the inconsistency, for example by adding consonant
cognitions, increase the importance of consonant cognitions or decreasing the importance
of dissonant ones. In the 1990s, research on the theory was revived and it has since been
gaining in interest [21, 22, 23, 24, 25].
The name itself of cognitive dissonance looks like very familiar in the context of
quantum cognition, suggesting something like an ondulatory behavior. In fact, it has
been already considered in [26] where we can find a first attempt to design a quantum-like
model for cognitive dissonance. However, this model only considers dissonance between
decisions, using a simple model where the decisions correspond to non-commuting
observables on the same Hilbert space. Such a simple model of course leads to the
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same problems already described for the opinion poll problem, violating the replicability
principle. Moreover, the cognitive dissonance has also been considered in the context of
quantum cognition to explain the violation of the sure thing principle of decision theory
[4], even if the generality of the mechanism seems not to be fully evidenced.
Postdecision cognitive dissonance is a particular case of cognitive dissonance, where
dissonance is produced between decisions and a subsequent test. This final test can be a
preference choice [27] or a judgement [12]. In particular, results in [12] show that bettors
at a horse racetrack are more confident in their chosen horse just after placing the bet
because they cannot change it (the bettors felt post-decision dissonance). In other words,
the commitment to a decision activates dissonance-reducing processes which modify
previous judgements. Various experiments confirm this result: for example, voting for
a candidate leads to a more favorable opinion of the candidate in the future [28, 29].
This effect seems to be very general and powerful. For example Deutsch and Gerard
[30] found a similar result in a social validation context: when people have to make a
judgement or a choice, the simple act of writing the decision becomes a commitment
and influences judgements.
Let us now briefly analyze these experimental results in more detail. Subjects’
decisions, if not explicitly performed, are reversible: subjects can change idea. On the
contrary, subjects making an explicit choice make a conscious and irreversible act. For
example subjects could tell to someone their choice or write it on a paper. In any case,
their choice or judgement is now a known and certain fact, it cannot be modified anymore
(of course they can change, but they have to declare the first choice as wrong). This is
different from simply thinking to a choice or a judgement. This analysis is consistent
with the postulates previously presented. In particular, I underline two points.
First of all, subjects’ decision (the chosen horse) become a new part of the cognitive
system. In the quantum-like formalism, we can say that the act of making an explicit
choice creates into the cognitive system a new element in a new Hilbert space. Thus
we have started with a single cognitive system, relevant to the judgement of a possible
event (e.g. the horse will win the race) and we have now an additional cognitive system
relevant to the taken choice. These two subsystems form together the subject’s cognitive
system and they need to be considered together. The study of only one of them makes
impossible in general giving a correct description of subject’s behaviour. This new
point has been described in the first postulate. In the horse-race example, the two
subsystems are in different states. While the first describes uncertainty about the race,
the new subsystem represents a certain knowlegde about the chosen horse. This last
state cannot be modified anymore, it is certain and non-reversible. Its influence on
subsequent judgements may depend from many factors, like for example the cognitive
dissonance or the social validation. In the last part of the article, we will see how the
quantum formalism allows describing such influence.
The second point to underline is that only new knowledge produces collapse. The
postdecision dissonance experiment is particularly interesting because it allows to test
the validity of postulate 4 in the quantum-like model. Let us consider for semplicity an
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event A, which can be true or false. For example, A can be that horse will win the race.
According to postulates in [3], if A is concluded to be true, the initial state describing
subject’s judgement is projected by using a suitably defined projection operation. This
postulate is analogue to the postulate of quantum physics also called collapse postulate.
According to it, a measurement causes a sudden and non-reversible change of the
physical state into a new state describing the certain knowledge of measured physical
quantity. On the contrary, when the system is not measured, its evolution in time
is driven by suitable unitary operators and it is always reversible. According to the
previous quantum decision model [3], subject’s decision to bet on a horse would lead
the subject to change its mental state. In the post-bet condition, the subject should
simply judge that the winning probability for the chosen horse is 100%, which is the
state consistent with the fact. This is of course a non-realistic description. Where is
the problem? The only case where we can think that the collapse happens is when the
subject knows that an event is true. For example, after the end of the race, the subject
knows which horse has won and its cognitive state represents such certain event. On the
contrary, the previous version of the quantum cognition model assumed that the collapse
just happens when the subject makes a choice, even if he does not really know what is
the correct answer. Just like described for the question order effect, the cognitive system
becomes bipartite: one subsystem is relevant to the knowledge of the bet decision, the
other is relevant to the knowledge about the horse (the probability to win). After the
bet, the system is subjected to a conditional unitary operation which modifies the second
subsystem. It consists essentially in a rotation of that state towards a state consistent
with the taken decision. This is a dissonance-reducing strategy.
6. The belief-action entanglement model
It is important to distinguish this approach from the belief-action-entanglement model
(BAE) presented in [13]. In this paper the Hilbert space used to represent the experiment
is composite. The first subsystem is relevant to the categorization, while the other about
the action: in both cases, they can be considered as decisions, and thus the model can
be more generically considered as a decision-decision entanglement model.
First of all we note that further research should focus on the link between judgement
and decision. However, as we have seen in the previous sections, a quantum model based
on decisions can lead to some problems when we add judements to the experiment.
Let us suppose that after the categorization-decision test in [13] subjects are asked to
produce a probability judgement about the fact that the face is relevant to a good/bad
person. According to the actual model, the previous decision should impose a probability
judgement of 1 (certainty about the good/bad person). Of course this is not consistent
with real facts. At least subjects would adapt their judgements to the previous chioces,
but they wouldn’t show a collapse effect.
We could also imagine another variant of the experiment, where subjects are again
asked to perform the initial categorization task. According to the BAE model, the
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potential to categorize the face as a good guy is determined by an amplitude ψ(G),
and if this response is obtained, then it would produce a transition to state G. Thus
the new categorization task will simply produce again the same result, beacuse the
state is collpased on the answer G. On the contrary, subjects could make a different
categorization from the previous one, because their cognitive state about the good/bad
categorization is uncertain. This could be true expecially for ambiguous faces.
7. Grand repiprocity equations
I now present an important new prediction of the quantum cognition model that seems
to change the actual conclusions about quantum-like models.
Non-degenerste models show a very simple property, expressed by the grand-
reciprocity equations, also known as GR equations. Given two non-commuting
observables A,B acting on a single-qubit Hilbert space, we have that
p(A0|B0) = p(B0|A0) = p(A1|B1) = p(B1|A1) (4)
p(A0|B1) = p(B1|A0) = p(A1|B0) = p(B0|A1) (5)
However, an experimental test has been made in [7] by considering answers to two
dichotomic questions. The test evidenced violations of the GR equations.
According to quantum decision model, agent’s belief state just after the answer
is the normalized projection of the belief state onto the vector corresponding to the
answer. The test thus computes the probability that many different subjects give the
same answer (for example TRUE) to a question. We can say that such quantum-like
model works with answer probabilities: it is in fact a quantum decision model.
The model cannot say anything in general about mean judged probabilities without
additional hypotheses. Of course one can assume that judgements follow direct answers,
but in general this does not allow to derive directly a functional link between them. For
example, subjects could give a mean 70% judged probability about Clinton honesty with
low variance, leading to a 100% positive direct answer.
I thus conclude that the experimental test is only relevant to the quantum decision
model. Grand reciprocity equations, when tested with such probabilities, are violated:
answer probabilities are not fully symmetric.
The new model I propose instead works with judged probabilities. As also
recognized by one of the authors of [7], at the moment there aren’t experimental test
relevant to the symmetry of judged probabilities. Thus we can say that non-degenerste
models are at ther moment still valid in the context of quantum cognition models.
Further research could evidence that such models give good results only in spceific
experimental conditions, like fast judgements and correlated events. This seems to
find a first confirm from the inverse fallacy experiments [31], where subjects manifest
symmetry in judging conditional probabilities. Moreover, also similarity and typicality
judgements generally manifest symmetry. Quite interestinly, the symmetry violations
of similarity have found an explanation in a quantum-like framework by considering a
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non-degenerate model [5]. This suggests that symmetry is relevant to situations where
the judgement is performed with low mental resources, while asymmetry to situations
requiring a deeper analysis.
8. A quantum computational approach to quantum cognition
The use of concepts and operations taken from the quantum computation field may
allow the quantum cognition model to produce new results and predictions. In fact,
the use of quantum computational gates can help to find basic patterns in the unitary
evolution of the system. Previous attempts to use quantum algorithms in the context of
quantum cognition (see for example [32, 33, 34]) show - only in part - the potentialities of
this approach. In particular in [34] we can see the use of quantum computational gates,
while in [32, 33] we can find some attempts to use algorithms derived from Grover’s
algorithm to model some memory features.
Following [35], we first consider a single qubit model, where the cognitive task is
represented by a dichotomous question A: this question can be formulated in such a
way that it admits only two mutually exclusive answers, yes/true/1 and no/false/0. In
the revisited quantum cognition model, vector |1〉 represents a situation where question
about A has a certain true answer.In a similar way the vector |0〉 is defined. We underline
the fact that even if a subject chooses the 1 answer, the cognitive state is |1〉 only if
there is a certain knowledge that the answer to A is true.
The inner product between a generic state |s〉 and |1〉 is the amplitude 〈1|s〉, and
its squared magnitude, |〈1|s〉|2, corresponds to the probability that the answer to A
is yes with certainty. In other words, it represents the partial subject’s knowledge.
Thus, according to the quantum formalism, the opinion state |s〉 can be in a linear
superposition of vectors |1〉 and |0〉, where the superposition coefficients are the
amplitudes 〈0|s〉 and 〈1|s〉. This superposition represents an indefinite state.
In the two-qubit case, states are vectors in a space obtained by the tenson product of
the consituent Hilbert spaces. For example, the vector |00〉 means that we have the
tensor product of two single qubit vectors in 0 state.
A quantum logic gate is a unitary operator which reproduces in the quantum context
the behaviour of a logic gate. As shown in Deutsch [36], we can define a universal set of
gates, in the sense that every quantum algorithm can be efficiently simulated to arbitrary
fixed accuracy by a circuit composed by such gates.
8.1. Single qubit gates
We first consider the universal set of gates acting on a single qubit, which is formed by
the Hadamard gate H defined as follows
H|0〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), H|1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉) (6)
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and by the phase shift gate R(φ)
R(φ)|0〉 = |0〉, R(φ)|1〉 = eiφ|1〉 (7)
where the phase of the vector |1〉 is changed, and i is the complex number.
An interesting operator, obtained by the combination of such gates, is the single-qubit
interference operator, definbed as I(φ) = HR(φ)H , which simulates the Mach-Zehnder
interferometer:
I(φ) = HR(φ)H|0〉 = cos(φ/2)|0〉+ isin(φ/2)|1〉 (8)
The |0〉 vector is conventionally taken as a reference starting state. Every quantum
algorithm normally starts from it. The single-qubit interference operators can by simply
combined in the following way:
I(φ)I(θ) = I(φ+ θ) (9)
This operator has a very interesting interpretation: the initial state |0〉 is split into an
equal superposition with the first Hadamard operator. Then, a phase shift is introduced
so that, when recombining the states with the final Hadamard transform, interference
terms appear. Of course a null phase shift R(0) reduces the operator to HH , which is
the identity operator.
Let us now try to use these concepts in the quantum cognition context. The
Hadamard gate is a representation change between two statistically unrelated events
A and B (that is P (A|B) = 1/2 and P (¬A|B) = 1/2). It is not important at this
stage to identify the meaning of the new representation, we can simply say that is an
unconscious change of viewing things. Two consecutive Hadamard gates (HH) describe
a change followed by a return to the initial representation, and so it is equivalent to
the identity. The operator HR(φ)H is very interesting also in the quantum cognition
context. We can interpret it as the basic thinking activity, which leads to a change in
beliefs. It is a representation change followed by a phase shift, with a final return to the
inital representation.
What is the meaning of the phase shift? It is evident from the single-qubit interference
operator that it has a very important role, since the magnitude of the phase shift
determines the intensity of the interference. First of all we note that it has not an
equivalent in the classic world. Equation 8 evidences that we can have positive or
negative interference, depending on the value of the phase.
Let us now try to use these concepts in the postdecision experiment. Let belief
state |s〉 = I(φ0)|0〉 describes a situation where the subject makes his own judgement
about the horse. If φ0 = pi/4, the estimated probabilities that the horse will win (or
not) are the same. Thus the application of the single-qubit interference operator I(φ)
to |s〉 will change the subject’s judgement, making him more or less confident about the
fact that the horse will win. What determines this? Simply the relative phase between
the inital phase and the phase shift. The final resulting phase will be φ0 + φ. If φ is
positive and less than pi/4, the probability relevant to |1〉 increases. If φ is negative but
higher than −pi/4, the probability relevant to |1〉 decreases. In the next subsection we
analyze coditioning factors that can control such relative phase.
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8.2. Two qubit gates
One simple set of two-qubit universal quantum gates is the Hadamard gate (H), the
phase shift gate , and the controlled NOT gate. The controlled NOT gate, or C-NOT
is defined as
CNOT |00〉 = |00〉, CNOT |01〉 = |01〉,
CNOT |10〉 = |11〉, CNOT |11〉 = |10〉 (10)
Tthe combination of such gates allows obtaining a particular kind of two-qubit gates,
the conditional gates. For example, the controlled phase shift CR(φ) is defined as
CR(φ)|00〉 = |00〉, CR(φ)|01〉 = |01〉,
CR(φ)|10〉 = |10〉, CR(φ)|11〉 = eiφ|11〉 (11)
which evidences that the phase shift is applied to the second qubit only when the first
qubit is in state 1. We can also write a conditional single-qubit interference operator (or
simply conditional interference operator), which acts as 8 only if the first qubit is |1〉.
The conditional interference operator is interesting in the quantum cognition
context. In the postdecisional cognitive dissonance experiment, the second qubit
(conventionally) describes the judgement about the horse race, while the first qubit
is relevant to the explicit decision to bet. Before betting, the first qubit is an indefinite
state. But after betting (or publicly choosing an horse), this qubit is in a definite state
(for convention, |1〉). Now the conditional interference operator acts modifying the
judgements about the horse. The phase shift derives from the cognitive dissonance. It
is easy to understand that the choice (|0〉 or |1〉) will activate two different conditional
phase shifts. We can define a general conditional phase shift CR(φ0, φ1) as
CR(φ0, φ1)|00〉 = |00〉, CR(φ0, φ1)|01〉 = eiφ0 |01〉,
CR(φ0, φ1)|10〉 = |10〉, CR(φ0, φ1)|11〉 = eiφ1 |11〉 (12)
Thus the state before betting is
|s0〉 = |0〉+ |1〉√
2
R(θ)|0〉 (13)
where R(θ)|0〉 is the conventional way to describe the initial undefined state. The angle θ
can be pi/4 in case of complete uncertainty. The state after the betting is CR(φ0, φ1)|s0〉,
which results
|0〉R(θ + φ0)|0〉+ |1〉R(θ + φ1)|0〉√
2
(14)
It is easy to see that when θ = φ1 = pi/4 and φ0 = −pi/4 we have a maximally entangled
state. This is of course and extreme case, where the act of betting strongly influences
judgements. A positive decision (value 1 in the first register) leads to a pi/4 additional
shift. On the contrary, a negative decision (0 value in the first register, that is the horse
won’t win) leads to a −pi/4 decision.
We can finally try to provide an interpretation for the phase shift operation in
terms of cognitive dissonance: subjects, when managing different registers relevant
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to the same event, perform unitary operations trying to align such registers. This
is spontaneusly driven by the mental stress or discomfort experienced by a subject,
which in the quantum cognition model corresponds to the phase shift contained in the
conditional operator CR(φ0, φ1). If the perceived cognitive dissonance (the feeling of
stress) is low, this means that φ0 = φ1 = 0, and the conditional operator is the identity
operator: the decision encoded in the first register doesn’t entangle with the second
register. A strong dissonance, on the contrary, corresponds to a strong phase shift
(φ0 = −pi/4, φ1 = pi/4). This interpretation is also consistent with the description of
phase provided in the Grovers’ description of human memory [32], where the efficiency
of the algorithm is shown to be determined by the value of phase shift. Just like the
search algorithm works better with a particual value of the phase shift, similarly the
entity of the cognitive dissonance effect can be put in correspondence with the value of
the phase shift involved in the quantum operators relevant to the evolution.
9. Conclusions
In this article I present a new approach to the quantum cognition, where a more coherent
use of the concept of state collapse is provided. In fact, given an uncertain event, it
is evident from postdecision cognitive dissonance experiments that choosing the most
probable outcome does not entail a collapse of the cognitive system. The only way the
collapse may happen is when new information is given and there is certainy about the
event. Thus postulate 4 of the quantum cognition model is modificed and consequences
of it are derived.
In particular, it results that even the simplest cognitive operations lead to the
creation of composite systems in the quantum cognition model. To treat them, it
is usefult to use concepts derived from the quantum computation, like for example
conditional operations and entangling gates.
Finally, I underline that this new approach needs further work and test with
different cognitive experiments. The conditional operations could be very useful in
studying social validation experiments, where information provided by other people
influence the single subject. An approach using concepts taken from spin chains models
(Isin model for example) could lead to interesting results, treating such effects like phase
transitions.
10. Appendix
A quantum system is said to be composite when it is composed by different subsystems
(for example, different particles). In particular, in the case of two subsystems the state is
said bipartite. The simplest example of a bipartite state is given by a two-qubit system.
A two-qubit pure state is a vector in a space obtained by the tenson product of the
consituent Hilbert spaces. For example, the vector |00〉 means that we have the tensor
product of two single qubit vectors in 0 state.
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A bipartite state is said to be separable or factorable if it can be written in the form
ρ =
∑
i
piρ
′
i ⊗ ρ′′i (15)
where ρ′i and ρ
′′
i are density matrices relevant to the first and the second subsystem,
respectively. In the special case when ρ = ρ′ ⊗ ρ′′ the density matrix is named product
state and represents a particular case of separable state. In general, separable states
can exhibit classical correlations.
Entanglement is one of the most intriguing features of quantum systems. A state is
defined as entangled if it cannot be written as in formula 15. Entangled states exhibit
correlations between the subsystems that are stronger than the analogous correlations
in the classic case. The simplest entagled pure states are the Bell states, which are also
maximally entangled states:
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) (16)
|Φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉) (17)
|Ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉) (18)
|Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉). (19)
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